Appropriate Celebration

In last class, we discussed the rather disturbing response which many Americans had to Osama Bin Laden's death.  I think that it is worth analysing exactly why this response was so alarming.

The Americans I spoke to about this when it happened said that they were celebrating Bin Laden's death, in particular, not the removal of a potential threat to their safety or the safety of those they cared about.  While I could understand celebrating the removal of such a threat (although Bin Laden was no longer all that significant of a threat), and could, to some extent, find it unobjectionable, these people were celebrating something totally different.  Their giddy moods were due not to the lifting of a weight on their minds, but to the idea of 'justice' happening to someone that they hated.  Some of the common phrases I heard at this time were along the lines of 'he deserved it' 'thank God we got our revenge,' and so on.  This displays a rather barbaric endorsement of revenge mentality which I think we must dispose of in order to live ideally moral lives.  While it is perfectly natural for many people to feel a desire for, or gratification from, the satisfaction of revenge, I do not think that acting upon these feelings is ethically acceptable in a situation where 'revenge' means the death of a sentient being.  It is also unacceptable in many other contexts (perhaps all contexts), but this is perhaps one of the most blatant examples.

Response: Humour and Palatability

In response to Raanan's post "Comedy" (April 30, 2012):

I think that humour and comedy frequently do help to convey important messages.  The main benefit, I think, to using humour in this way is that it makes potentially controversial issues less threatening.  The work of Terry Pratchett, for example, presents many of the problems of modern society in a funny, fictional context.  Reading about the dangers of censoring the press in a story about a fictional world populated with vampires, wizards, and werewolves is far more appealing to many people than reading about the same subject in a bleak, non-fictional treatise, or even in a dark, dystopian-future novel type setting.  I think that this same principal often applies to music; musicians can often address serious issues without accruing nearly as much opposition as politicians addressing the same issues.  This does not make their messages any less important or well-thought-out; it simply makes them seemingly less threatening to political systems than more officially conveyed messages.

Q&A 9, Second Answer

The basic form of my question is: What is the best balance between redistributive taxation and allowing people to keep the results of mixing their labour?

I think that a steep slope of taxation, which eventually flatlines at a very high rate, would probably be the best system.  This way, even the rich have some financial motivation to continue working, albeit far less than they do in the current American economy.  Furthermore, this high rate of taxation for the rich, medium rate for the middle class, low rate for the lower class, and nonexistent rate for the very poor would allow the government to apportion a relatively large amount of money to welfare (or a similar system designed to provide all citizens with at least a decent standard of living).  Such a society could also gradually improve the standards of living for those using the welfare-or-something-similar system, as with the advance of technology and society, more resources would become freely available.

Q&A 9, First Answer

The basic form of my question is: Should nations refrain from contributing to climate change, or work to reverse it at the cost of contributing to it temporarily?

I think that they should attempt to strike a balance.  Some ways of contributing to climate change, like lack of recycling, littering, or use of unnecessary products (makeup, etc.) which are bad for the environment have nothing to do with researching environmentally friendly alternatives to environmentally negative practices.  As such, a nation could enact laws to discourage this type of behaviour, like fines for littering or cash incentives for recycling.  However, they should not focus on preventing climate change at the expense of stopping technological progress in areas which can potentially help the environment.  At this point, climate change has gone too far to simply stop.  Unless humanity takes an active role in actually reversing the effects of climate change, global warming will continue regardless of humanity's contribution to it.  Furthermore, most people will likely object far less to developing environmentally friendly technologies than to ceasing their use of technology.  Therefore, I do think that nations should focus their resources on developing ways to help the environment, but also implement measures to help prevent further contribution to climate change as long as doing so does not set back this research.

Means and Ends

The dispute over whether the ends justify the means is both well-known and contentious.  However, a less-known issue is the flip-side of this - whether the means justify the ends.  An example of this concept would be a person deciding to live an unhealthy life, consuming non-nutritious foods and taking many risks, and then dying early as a consequence.  While most people seem to accept that this particular scenario relies simply on personal choice, the issue can also apply to much bigger questions.  One of these which has particular relevance today is whether humans should expend their energy and resources trying to develop means of transportation which cause less pollution than most current cars, or whether they should simply continue to utilise cars which run on fossil fuels, as in the short run this is easier.  I think that, like that of the better-known 'ends-justifying-means' dispute, the answer to this issue is not clear-cut.  In some cases, the means do justify even bad ends.  In others, the resultant ends are far too terrible to justify even the most pleasant of means.

Q&A 8, Second Answer

My question is: Does Barnett accurately characterise the point of a rehabilitative justice system?

I do not think so.  The system Barnett describes as rehabilitative is, ultimately, a failed system; furthermore, the methods of rehabilitation he describes are not by any means ideal or effective.  He suggests that a rehabilitative system works on the concept that punishing criminals will cause them to recognise the immoral nature of their crimes, thus preventing them from engaging in criminal behaviour in the future.  However, an ideal and effective rehabilitative justice system would not punish criminals, but would instead provide them with therapy and other non-hostile ways to recuperate from whatever harm prompted them to act criminally in the first place.  In the end, such a system would reintegrate former criminals into society in circumstances substantially better than those in which they lived prior to committing their crimes, and hopefully dissuade them from acting criminally in the future.

Q&A 8, First Answer

The basic form of my question is: Apart from the ticking-bomb scenario, are there any cases in which torture is even close to morally justifiable?

I do not think so, provided that the definition of the ticking-bomb scenario is sufficiently broad.  By such a definition, not every ticking-bomb scenario necessarily includes a literal bomb.  The term simply refers to any situation in which 1. An event will, without intervention, inevitably occur.  2. The event, if it occurs, will cause serious injury or death to a very large number of people.  3. We can stop this event from occurring if we obtain the necessary information.  Apart from such a situation, I cannot think of any time when torture would be remotely morally justifiable.

Response: Appeal of Revenge

In response to Brian's post "Rehabilitation as a Radical Solution" (April 29, 2012):

I think that the appeal of a retributive justice system is its fulfilment of people's wishes for revenge.  Regardless of its irrationality, the desire for revenge is a very deeply felt emotion in many, perhaps most, people.  A retributive justice system provides people with a way to satisfy this wish without transgressing the bounds of the law, and therefore without risking either personal harm or a guilty conscience.  Many people instinctively feel as though those who commit a crime or other harm against someone without justification deserve to have the same thing happen to them.  Of course, this leads to an endless cycle of revenge, which in medieval times often went on for generations in the form of blood feuds.  A retributive justice system regulates this somewhat, but still satisfies enough of people's wish for retribution that they do not feel wronged as much as they might in a society with a rehabilitative justice system.

Response: Appeal of Rebelling

In response to Brian's post "Prohibition Anyways" (April 22, 2012):

In addition to the difficulty of actually enforcing drug banning, I think that it may in fact increase people's desires to use the banned drugs. Most people who use drugs begin doing so during adolescence or young adulthood, when they have just moved away from their parents and are enjoying their new sense of independence. As such, they seek out ways to rebel against not only their parents, but society and the law as a whole.

If drug use were legal (although regulated), it would lose some of this appeal. As a result, the rate of new drug users might actually drop.

Q&A 7, Second Answer

The basic form of my question is: What attitude should parents have towards their children?

We have already discussed the immorality of parents viewing their children as possessions, as resources to help them in their old age, and as people whose futures they can determine as they please (duplicates of themselves, etc.).  How, then, should parents view their children?  I think that they should view them as separate, independent entities, just as they view other adults - they should simply recognise that children have certain needs that adults do not, and thus act as teachers, some type of caretakers, and (ideally) friends.  The first two attitudes should only last as long as they need to; once the child attains a level of maturity whereat they are able to make fully conscious decisions (possibly indicated by legal adulthood; certainly no later) then their actions are no longer the parents' responsibility to regulate or guide.  Hopefully, parents and adult children can still maintain friendships, but if their personalities are simply not compatible, or if one party or another has an old grievance against another which makes it impossible to keep up a healthy relationship, then neither party has an obligation to continue the friendship.

Q&A 7, First Answer

The basic form of my question is: Would it be ethical to create multiple clones of the same person and raise them in different environments?

I see no reason for it not to be ethical.  Certainly people could use the idea unethically; for example (as Brandon brought up in one of his posts) parents could try to 'replace' a deceased child with a clone of that child, which would almost certainly result in some kind of psychological mistreatment of the clone child. However, if the people around the clones treat them as unique individuals, with no socially significant similarity to the other genetically identical clones, I do not think that there would be any problem.  The only possible issue with this might be that, if most of humanity eventually became clones of just a few people, genetic variation would become almost nonexistent, probably resulting in problems with any non-cloned children that people might choose to have.

Response: Disproportionate Effects

In response to Brandon's post "Levin: Genius of the Times" (April 14, 2012):

First, a disclaimer; this is not all that closely related to Brandon's post.  I simply found a particular point in it interesting, and wished to elaborate upon it.  This post also relates, slightly, to a previous post I made.

The idea that otherwise relatively insignificant actions can have large effects on people due to other, unknown circumstances is actually quite well-documented, although usually in positive rather than negative cases.  For example, there have been some instances of people deciding against killing themselves because they heard a particular song on the radio.  As such, it seems logical that similarly minor events can have equally major effects in the opposite direction.  Also, even when a single negative action is not enough to harm a person to a major extent, the cumulative effect of many minor negative actions can easily add up to major consequences - in fact, many (perhaps even most) cases of non-chemical depression or suicide are due to a series of negative occurrences happening to one unfortunate person.  While of course it is impossible to know a person's exact circumstances, and so in most cases one's attempting to be exceptionally nice will be essentially irrelevant, the sometimes disproportionate effects of minor actions may be enough to encourage one to increase one's positive behaviour and decrease negative behaviour.

Subjectivity of Justice

If a legal system bans capital punishment, then it must not make exceptions, even for exceptional cases.  No matter how heinous a crime someone commits, then they cannot legally be executed.  The reason for this is that making even one exception to the law invalidates every case in which the law should apply; as there is no objective way to determine exceptions, breaking the law (and it would be breaking it) in order to fulfil a subjective ideal of justice is radically inappropriate.  After all, if the legal system makes an exception once, why would they not do so again?  It is easy to say that they will only make exceptions in cases where capital punishment is justified, but who exactly determines what constitutes justification?  One could suggest a codified definition of exceptions, but in that case they would no longer be exceptions, they would simply be part of the law!  As such, the law would not in fact be banning capital punishment, but merely making very specific circumstances in which it would apply.

Q&A 6, Second Answer

My question is: What types of racial profiling exist today?

Officially speaking, the United States does not sanction racial profiling.  Of course, in practice, it occurs fairly often, usually in the context of law enforcement investigatory practices (such as 'randomly determined' security searches, or 'random' selection of speeders to pull over).  Canada also does not officially sanction racial profiling, but has had similar cases of unofficial occurrence.  Other countries have stricter policies banning racial profiling, and still others not only allow it, but encourage it.  The practices regarding the subject vary considerably from nation to nation, depending on diversity of population, distribution of wealth between those with differing racial backgrounds, form of government, policies and social perceptions regarding race, and a large number of other factors.

Q&A 6, First Answer

The basic form of my question is: Why would people support the idea of racial profiling despite knowing that it does not work?

While I imagine that most supporters of racial profiling believe that it does work, there are also likely people who are aware of its inefficacy, yet who continue to support it.  It is difficult to determine why they do this.  The theory which springs most readily to mind is that they wish to use racial profiling to continue the oppression of minorities.  However, any one person who is subject to racial profiling is unlikely to incur much more than minor, temporary irritation, feelings of injustice, or other relatively insignificant psychological trauma.  How, then, could racial profiling reinforce isolation or oppression of minority groups?

There are two ways which I can think of at the moment.  One is that, although the effects of each individual profiling may be negligible, they can have the combined effect of reinforcing feelings of separation, inferiority, or other oppression-contributing emotions in the profilee.  The other, which is, I think, the more likely of the two is that racial profiling can send a message to the majority that the profiled minority is different from, and lesser than, the majority is.

Verbal Aggression and Hate Speech

One of the more common reasons for creating hate speech codes is that hate speech often causes psychological or emotional trauma to victims.  This is undoubtedly true.  However, I do not think that hate speech is by any means the only type of verbal aggression which can cause severe emotional trauma, and so I would suggest that speech codes should not be limited to hate speech, but should instead apply to any kind of repeated, intentional verbal aggression.

Calling someone a 'n-word' is extremely rude, extremely racist, overall inappropriate, and likely to cause the target at least some emotional trauma.  Calling someone a 'piece of s*** (profane equivalent of crap)' is also extremely rude, overall inappropriate, and likely to cause the target at least some emotional trauma.  I do not think that the single missing element, that of racism, is the most significant part of the problem by any means.  As such, I think that both types of verbal aggression merit preventative measures - most likely a combination of educational programs (which would have minimal effect, but would hopefully help prevent unintentional insults) and, perhaps, fines or negative academic consequences for those who repeatedly and intentionally violated the measures.

Response: The Actual Point of Justice

In response to Brian's post "Discussing the Death Penalty Beyond Race" (April 7, 2012):

I agree that the death penalty is immoral.  This is primarily because the point of the justice system is, at least in theory, supposed to be to protect people from those who have committed criminal acts.  Even if one is opposed to the more rehabilitation-focused justice system strategies in some other countries (I am not; the article on that Norwegian prison was great, by the way), one can at least admit that a life sentence is essentially as effective as the death penalty in this respect.  The only reason for the death penalty to exist is to satisfy some people's desire for revenge - hardly an appropriate basis for a government policy which literally controls the life or death of other people.  Some also try to justify its existence by claiming that it is a more effective deterrent to crime than other sentences, but there is absolutely no evidence to prove this is the case; in fact, if the statistics on crime and prison return rates in countries with more lenient justice systems are anything to go by, it may actually be less effective in preventing crime than other, immeasurably more humane crime prevention methods.

Q&A 5, Second Answer

The basic form of my question is: Is racial profiling actively harmful to crime prevention efforts?

I think the answer is yes, and very much so.  Firstly, racial profiling does not actually cause investigation only into members of the targeted group; many people may seem as though they belong to the group, but are not actually part of it.  For example, when targeting Middle Eastern people, security agents often end up investigating a large number of Italian people, who are quite outside the target group.  Even if profiling measures were more accurate, the idea is still inefficient; investigating innocent Middle Eastern tourists can easily distract security agents from catching a mixed-heritage criminal.  Also, dangerous groups are typically well-informed, so if a terrorist organisation discovers that racial profiling measures are targeting people who look a certain way, they can simply find agents who look different.

Secondly, racial profiling fosters resentment among people who it targets.  If Japanese people, for example, were targeted on suspicion of carrying bombs, then many innocent members of that group would likely become angry with this discriminatory attitude, and possibly consider becoming bombers.

Lastly, racial profiling is undeniably discriminatory.  Targeting certain groups of people for heightened investigation reinforces artificial boundaries between people, and supports stereotypes and other forms of discrimination.  Particularly when the targeted group is already subject to some form of prejudice, racial profiling can serve as yet another manifestation of social inequality and injustice, and social inequality is considerably likely to lead to some form of rebellion - whether it be picketing, boycotting, or terrorism.

Q&A 5, First Answer

The basic form of my question is: Should hate crime laws apply only to crimes committed against minorities?

At first, the answer seems quite obviously to be no.  However, there are advantages to making hate crime laws specific.  Two of these are, first, that having special laws in place which protect only them might help reassure members of targeted minorities, and second, that making hate crime laws exclusive also sends a message to a country's population that the protected minorities are officially recognised and supported by the government.  Making hate crime laws general accomplishes neither of these objectives.

However, I still think that the good of generalised laws outweighs the bad.  General laws will protect people in the event of a minority becoming the majority too quickly for legal systems to recognise the change; they will protect everyone, thus not causing unfair discrimination against the majority, and they will also help curb resentment by members of the majority.  Laws protecting only homosexuals, for instance, are likely to make already prejudiced non-homosexuals angry, and may somewhat bother even people (of all sexualities) who are not biased.  General laws would still protect minorities more than majorities, simply because hate crimes are typically directed against members of minority groups, but they would not discriminate against anyone simply because they were part of the majority.

Regressing Is Not Progress

I firmly support environmentalism.  However, I often find myself at odds with other environmentalists due to a difference in the direction of our beliefs.  While I think that finding ways to produce electricity efficiently and without pollution is the best solution to global warming and environmental deterioration, these other environmentalists often advocate a strategy of regressing - namely, choosing not to use electricity at all.  While I agree that minimising one's use of electricity is a good idea, due to the current methods of electricity production, I do not think that abandoning electricity permanently is a good idea.

To many people today, the lifestyles of those in the past may seem idyllic.  Living in a beautiful medieval castle, riding horses around rather than taking cars, and farming the land for food may seem like a pretty picture to some, but they are leaving out some very important details.  Horses are much slower than cars and cannot carry nearly as much.  Subsistence farming is a risky business, as if there is a plague or disease of the crops, the farmers may starve.  Lastly, medieval castles had little to no insulation or plumbing.  Thus, they stank badly and were very cold in the winter.  Furthermore, abandoning electricity would make the production of many medicines difficult or impossible, so the diseases which frequently devastated medieval populations would begin to take their toll on any who chose this lifestyle.  Regressing, while it may at first seem appealing, is ultimately a bad idea.  There are reasons that we have progressed away from the past.

Artificial Necessities

All too often, people spend vast amounts of time, effort, and/or money in order to conform to traditions which are quite unnecessary.  In the (few) cases where people actually wish to use the traditions because of their own merits, rather than because they are traditions, then of course there is nothing wrong with this.  If, however, people are only performing actions in order to conform with unnecessary tradition, then there is a problem.

Two examples which come to mind at once (probably due to my essay) are aspects of engagement and marriage - specifically, engagement rings and weddings.  Many people believe that if a person does not present their potential fiancé with a costly engagement ring, their affection is not genuine.  This is entirely phony, as the concept of diamond engagement rings was actually introduced by the diamond industry in order to boost sales.  Even amongst those who are aware of this, however, engagement rings continue to be a popular gesture, perhaps primarily because if they fail to conform to the engagement tradition, others (parents and friends especially) will likely question the sincerity of their (or, more commonly, of their fiancé's) affection.  Weddings are similarly problematic.  It has become a tradition in America to spend a large amount of money on one's wedding.  If one does not, or if one marries without a wedding, then many assume that the people getting married are either impoverished, in a rush, or marrying without the approval of their families - furthermore, they often assume that the marrying people will regret their decision to 'skimp' on their wedding later in life.  This is ridiculous, as it could be that the people marrying simply do not wish to spend a great deal of money on a single occasion.  Having a costly wedding is not inherently bad, but neither is there any reason why it should be considered necessary for a full life.

Majority Issues and Minority Effects

Sometimes, issues which most people view as being minor, but affecting the majority of people, can be major issues for minorities.  I was thinking about this primarily due to a conference I recently attended about sexuality and gender identity.  One thing I noticed at this conference is that there were a lot of transwomen who, due to their height or bone structure, looked less than totally feminine.  While these women may have been perfectly satisfied with their bodies and appearances, society's views on femininity could easily lead others to view them in a negative light.  This is closely related to the 'majority' issues of the supposedly ideal type of female appearance, and of men who cross-dress.

The first issue can lead to women without genetically determined 'ideal' body structures being viewed as inferior to those with those societally determined ideal bodies.  In addition to the obvious problems for a majority of women, however, this can particularly lead to discrimination against transwomen, who rarely have an 'ideal' female bone structure.  As such, this issue can cause an already marginalised group to suffer more discrimination unrelated to the original cause of discrimination - certainly a bad thing.

The second issue may be even more detrimental.  Of course it does restrict the freedom of men who may wish to cross-dress, which is unjust and undoubtedly a bad thing, but it can lead to actual violence against transwomen.  While transmen who do not 'pass' (that is, appear male to all observers) usually suffer the inconvenience and embarrassment of being wrongly referred to as female, but are subject to no other negative effects (due to being thought merely tomboys or, possibly and slightly more dangerously, lesbians), non-passing transwomen are sometimes attacked, on the assumption that they are cross-dressing men.  It is true that actual men who cross-dress can also become victims of attack, such men typically suffer much less from refraining to cross-dress than transwomen suffer from dressing as men - the women have to actively hide an important part of their identity.  While I do not mean to marginalise the negative effects of men being denied the opportunity to cross-dress when they wish, it is undeniable that the deaths of women perceived as cross-dressing men are a much more serious issue.  However, due to the fact that transgendered people are a minority, society usually only focuses on the more minor issue.

Response: Justified Censorship

In response to Brian's post "A Quote Misattributed to Mark Twain" (March 31, 2012):

I agree that most censorship is both unnecessary and unethical.  However, I think that in some cases it is justified.  For example, because exposing children to excessive violence, gore, or sexual imagery at a young age often causes psychological harm to those children, and as such censoring those things is justified.  Of course, adults can take advantage of media including the above elements, as long as they ensure that it does not end up making its way into the hands of minors.

Certain things which American society considers worthy of censorship are certainly unjustly banned or restricted.  Rating a film higher because it includes people of the same gender kissing is ridiculous; if exposing children to images of people kissing is psychologically harmful (which I am pretty sure it is not) then all films showing people kissing should be rated higher, up to an including 'Snow White and the Seven Dwarves.'  Furthermore, no adults should ever kiss whilst in view of children.  To do otherwise is clearly an illustration of homophobia; homoromantic behaviour is not inherently more 'edgy' than heteroromantic behaviour, nor is it more closely linked to sexual behaviour.  There are many other examples of unjust censorship as well, but I think that there are also some things which should be censored due to their effects on the psychological well-being of children.

Double Standards

Sexism goes both ways.  While in modern American society women's rights are a common topic of conversation, there are also ways in which society discriminates against men.  These ways may be less in number, but in many cases they are more serious.  For example, one of the best-known ways in which society discriminates against women is by paying them less than men for the same amount of work.  This is without doubt a serious inequality, but it makes less difference to individual women than do some of the inequalities directed towards men, such as the judicial system's tendency to mete out more severe punishments to men than to women for the same crimes.  Other examples of discrimination against men occur in the social norm requiring men to repress their emotions, many people's tendency to dismiss domestic violence against men (by other men or by women) or even find it funny, and the exclusivity of selective service.

Is Abrasiveness Immoral?

Most people have encountered at least a few abrasive people in their lives - curt cashiers at Dunkin' Donuts, gruff receptionists at the doctor's office, greasy telemarketers who get nasty when their clients show a lack of interest in their product.  Are these people acting immorally, or are they simply being rather unpleasant?

I think that the answer varies widely depending on the circumstances.  If the unpleasant cashier had just learned of his dear brother's death in a car accident, then his manner is not just understandable, it may be morally justifiable, if it would cause him a great deal of emotional distress to adopt a pleasant manner.  The distress he would incur by putting on a facade of pleasantness would far exceed the distress incurred by his customers.

If, on the other hand, the gruff receptionist had simply missed out on a few hours of sleep the previous night and did not feel like being personable, then she might be acting immorally, because she was causing more distress to her customers than she would incur by acting nicely.  Of course, other variables could affect this situation as well - the customers could also be acting unpleasantly, in which case it would irk the receptionist more to be pleasant, for example.

Response: Choosing Characteristics

In response to Brandon's post "Surrogate Motherhood" (March 25, 2012):

I agree with the idea that clients of surrogate mothers should not be aware of the physical characteristics of the mother who will be having their child.  However, I think that this should not be peculiar to surrogate motherhood - the industry enabling artificial insemination should adopt a similar policy.  Currently, there are websites for artificial insemination services which list the height, ethnicity, and other physical details of the men who donated the material which would be available to whoever wishes to make use of the service.  For the same reason that I think surrogate mothers should not provide details of their physical characteristics, I think that sperm donors should not provide their physical details - that is to say, it would help ensure that the parents want a child, no matter who that child turns out to be, rather than a person who they can fit into a certain preconceived mould. 

Not As Expected

Before I began reading the essays on surrogate motherhood, I had already formed an opinion on the issue - namely, that there were no ethical problems with it.  While aware that my knowledge of the issue was far from complete, I thought it was probably extensive enough that I could make a fairly confident judgement.  However, after reading the initial essay, I determined that - while there is no ethical problem with an ideally implemented system of surrogate motherhood - as the practice exists today there are actually several problems with it.  Furthermore, a number of challenging problems even caused me to consider that the concept of surrogate motherhood itself might be unethical (although I later developed, or read in one of the later essays, solutions to these problems.)

This made me think about premature judgements in general.  While I don't think there is a problem with them, this only holds true when one remains open to revising their initial opinions, and when one is careful to investigate an assumption further before applying it in any practical context.  Holding on to old opinions even in light of new, contradictory evidence, or applying an opinion in an important context when one does not have sufficient relevant information, can and does cause many problems in the world today.  I shall have to examine my own opinions and determine which of them I should soonest investigate further for practical and ethical reasons.

Response: Bias Goes Both Ways

In response to Brandon's post "You Have a Bias and I Do Not" (March 7, 2012):

One other point here is that children who have had good relationships with their parents may also be biased, in the opposite direction from those who had bad relationships.  Because someone who views their parents as friends will quite naturally wish to treat them well, they may find it difficult to conceive of the idea that they could validly choose not to do so - they think that their wish is in fact an obligation.  They may impose their own experience of parent/child relations on everyone else, and as such come to the conclusion that everyone (or most people) are obligated to treat their parents with above-average courtesy and care.

If we accept that this bias is possible, negative bias is also possible, and parental bias is possible, then should we conclude that the only people who can validly take part in the debate over parental obligation are those who have no children and had completely neutral relationships with their parents?  I do not think so.  Instead, those people who have potential bias (which, I think, means the vast majority of people) should be very careful to ensure that their views are not being influenced unduly by their personal experiences.

General Obligations

I think there are some (rare) situations in which children may have an obligation to remain in contact with their parents even if they do not particularly wish to.  However, this is not due to any sort of familial connection, and can apply in any relationship.  Furthermore, the general principle can apply to any pairing of an action/gain nature.  I've tried to set it out below in as straightforward a manner as possible.

C = cost to oneself    G = the amount of good others gain from your action
In this setup, the minimum gap between C and G is +4.

1) A situation wherein a generally decent parent wants their child to stay in contact with them, and the child finds this slightly inconvenient (the child does not hold any friend-like feelings toward the parent)
C = 1    G = 8    The result is +7, so the child is morally obliged to stay in contact, unless C increases or G decreases.

2) A situation wherein a rather bad parent wants their child to stay in contact with them, and the child does not want to do so (their relationship with the parent is quite bad)
C = 5    G = 6    The result is +1, which is not enough.  If the child chooses to stay in contact with the parent, they will be acting in a supererogatory manner.

3) A situation in which a good parent wants their child to stay in contact with them, and the child shares that desire (they are friends)
C = -4    G = 8    The result is +12, so this is morally obligatory - however, the obligation is irrelevant, because the child wants to stay in contact with their parent anyway.

4) To illustrate that this does not only apply to parent/child relationships, or indeed any relationship at all, this example is slightly different.  In it, a person enjoys the taste of meat, but realises that the production of meat comes at a cost to farm animals.  Thus, the farm animals would gain from the person's becoming a vegetarian or vegan.
C = 7    G = 20   The result is +13, so this is morally obligatory.

This does not invalidate my earlier post about Dixon's confusion of sentiment with obligation.  After a friendship ends, unless one or both sides retain lingering sentiment, choosing to help a former friend over a stranger provides no more good to the friend than one could give to the stranger - the G numbers are equal.

What Parents Owe to Children

If one accepts, as I do, that children do not owe anything to their parents simply because of the parent/child relationship which exists between them, then it might occur to one to ask what, if anything, parents owe to their children.  After all, if children's lack of filial obligation is due to their inability to choose their parents, then shouldn't parents (who cannot choose the sort of people their children will be) also base their actions towards their offspring purely on voluntary friendship?

I think that the answer is firmly in the negative, for a number of reasons.  Firstly, while it is true that parents cannot choose the personality of their children, they do choose to have children.  With that choice comes an unspoken agreement to provide certain services and resources for the children, regardless of what sort of people the children turn out to be.  This applies even in cases where the children deviate hugely from the parents' expectations, such as when a child turns out to be autistic or a prodigy, gay or transgendered, a follower of a different religion or philosophy, and so on.

But why should such an agreement exist?  That answer lies partly with society and partly with biology.  Biologically, children are incapable of caring for themselves prior to reaching a certain age, so if their parents neglect them they will suffer large amounts of harm or even death.  This harm is a direct result of their parents' decisions to create and then neglect them, and harming another human being without justification is morally wrong, so the parents are morally obligated to care for them in order to prevent harming them.  Sociologically, children (or, in legal terms, minors) are subject to more legal restrictions than are adults; for example, they cannot work more than a certain number of hours in a given period of time.  Thus, parents are morally obligated to provide them with what they cannot obtain due to society's restrictions, because to do otherwise would be creating a severely unequal society, which is again morally wrong.  Once children become biological and legal adults, parents' obligations towards them dissolve, and any further services they provide must either be out of friendship or part of mutually agreed-upon deals.

The last issue we must address is that of love.  Depriving children of parental love almost invariably causes lasting or even permanent psychological damage to those children.  As such, agreeing to love one's children is one of the initial requirements in the decision to conceive or adopt children in the first place.  However, love is not something which people can create artificially; it is an emotion, and must occur naturally.  In most cases, parents do naturally love their children.  However, in the extremely rare cases in which they do not, we cannot blame them for it - ought implies can, and if a parent cannot love their child then we cannot say they ought to.  However, the parent has indeed committed an immoral act - not, as it might first appear, neglecting to love their child, but instead deciding to have a child in the first place when they would be incapable of loving that child.  In such cases, the parent might be wise to attempt to locate a situation in which to place their child where the child could receive the sort of love necessary for healthy psychological development.

Duties of Friendship?

I think that Dixon confuses moral obligation with emotional inclination.  By suggesting that people have duties to their friends, he misses the point of friendship, which is that it is defined by the actions people take towards one another based on mutual emotional connections.  He claims that if one has a friend, one must as a result perform occasional favours for that friend, and if one fails to do so one is acting immorally.  I disagree with this claim, and instead offer the idea that if one fails to perform occasional favours for a friend (without extenuating circumstances, obviously) then one is simply not being a friend.  The friendship dissolves, and none of this is immoral, because friendship is necessarily voluntary, and terminating a friendship is not in and of itself immoral.

Dixon contends that one still has 'duties' to former friends even after the friendship has terminated, but again, I think he is confusing duty with inclination.  If a stranger and one's former close friend were both in need of a blood transfusion, it is true that one would likely choose to give blood to the former friend, and it is also true that if one chose to give blood to the stranger one's friends and acquaintances might condemn one, but none of that is due to morality.  One's preference for helping the former friend is due to lingering sentiment, perhaps so small an amount of it that one does not realise it is there.  One's current friends might condemn one for not helping the former friend because they presume that if sentiment does not exist, then the former friendship was not really sincere, and insincere friendships are in many cases immoral.  The same theory of lingering sentiment applies with parents; in most cases, no matter how estranged a child is from their parents, they retain some tiny scrap of sentiment which would lead them to help a parent over a stranger.  If this sentiment is not present, then any emotional inclination dissolves - exactly as Dixon's 'duties' dissolve if a child never had a friendship with their parents, or if they had good reason to terminate their friendship.

Due to the reasons above, I do not agree with Dixon's idea of  'duties of friendship.'  Instead, I concur wholeheartedly with Jane English's views on the topic.

Reactions to Removing Restrictions

During class on the 28th, we very briefly mentioned how, when certain countries removed or relaxed formerly strict drug regulations or bans, drug use temporarily increased before dropping back to or below what it had been before the countries removed the restrictions.  I was thinking about the motivation for that, and compared it to the high rate of alcoholism and drug use amongst college students relative to the general population.

I think that much of the motivation is likely a belief that, if something is forbidden, there must be something really brilliant about it in order for the 'enemy' (whether that enemy is the law, parental pressures, or societal norms) to decide to forbid it.  After time, people realise that the thing which was forbidden to them previously is, in reality, not particularly special.  The novelty and the thrill of doing something edgy wears off, and most (though not, of course, all) people cease doing that thing and settle down into relatively normal lives.

This can apply to things apart from drug use and alcohol consumption, of course.  Many young adults take part in protest movements or other forms of rebellion against societal norms.  Some of these people do so because of actual, genuine belief in a cause, but many seem to do it primarily because they want to rebel against something, or because it gives them some sense of power, which prior to becoming legal adults they did not possess much of.  This is unfortunate, because it leads to genuine supporters of a cause becoming minimised in the eyes of the public; brushed off, so to speak, as hormonally-charged young rebels who will in time 'come around' to conventional views.  However, it seems unlikely that this will change, as it appears to be human nature to take advantage of removed restrictions to an extent rather greater than is completely rational.

Response: Including Everyone

In response to Brandon's post "His Eye for Hers" (March 1, 2012):

Another advantage to using 'they' as a singular pronoun is that it includes everyone, regardless of gender.  Some might say that we can achieve this same effect by using the clunky, but politically correct 'he/she', but this is not the case.  Recently, some people have chosen to use alternative pronoun sets, such as 'zhe/zir', etc.  Still others have chosen to go by the singular 'they' at least in speech - and they would likely choose to use the same pronouns in writing if doing so were accepted as grammatical.

As it is not, I shall, in formal written contexts, continue trying to modify my sentences so that I can use plural pronouns rather than singular ones.  When writing informally, however, I shall continue to use the singular 'they,' in hopes that doing so may help its acceptability eventually spread to formal writing as well.

Holdover from Last Week

In response to Tyler's post "Shave Your Beard" (February 27, 2012):

It is true that pianists' playing on pianos does not deprive them of the use of their hands, except temporarily; but homosexuals' use of their reproductive organs does not deprive them of the ability to use those organs heterosexually.  They may not choose to do so, just as a pianist may choose to spend hours and hours every day playing on the piano, but at no point do they lose the option.

Also, it is true that as humans have discovered other ways to keep their faces warm, beards are no longer necessary.  However, humans are no longer having trouble in ensuring the survival of the species due to a lack of reproduction, or survival of offspring - if anything, we would be better off if fewer people had children, or if the same number of people had fewer children.  In this way, reproduction is no longer universally necessary either.  The only way in which homosexuality would pose a threat to the survival of humanity would be if everyone decided to engage exclusivly in homosexual relations - a highly unlikely eventuality.  Even then, though, we have now developed ways for people to reproduce without directly engaging in sexual relations at all (artifical insemination and so on).  Thus, a world composed completely of gay men and lesbians would still be able to produce children at the same rate as a world composed entirely of heterosexuals, and certainly at the same rate as a world composed of a mix of heterosexuals, homosexuals, bisexuals, asexuals, pansexuals, and so on.

Problematic Implementation

While the readings on the morality (or immorality) of prostitution were extensive, they glossed over quite a number of points which I thought were of extreme importance to the issue.  Before presenting those points, however, I will give an overview of my thoughts on the matter as presented by the articles.

Firstly, I disagree with the argument that prostitution necessarily reinforces patriarchal ideas of male dominance.  There are some male prostitutes in existence, a small number of which are heterosexual.  It is difficult to argue that these men are reinforcing patriarchal ideals, unless one argues that sex itself reinforces them - which would bring up a whole new issue.  While there are fewer male prostitutes, I think that is a result of society's views on the matter, not the cause of those views.  One could say that it is a result of lesser demand by women for sexual services, but again, I think that lower demand is a result of society (and even if it were not, then the fact that there would be a lesser demand for male prostitutes does not mean that prostitution in itself is immoral.)  If prostitution were recognised as a valid career option, it seems likely that many men would choose to work in the field.

Secondly, the idea that prostitution results in the weakening of family values is, I think, both invalid and not necessarily a bad thing if it were valid.  Sex does not necessarily create love, and neither is it required for love (between two people of the same age and with no biological relation) to exist; the fact that most (not all) loving, married couples have sexual relations with one another does not mean that they need to do so in order to love one another, or that having sexual relations outside the marriage would result in a lessening of love between them.  Also, if one took the idea that parents must have sexual relations with (and exclusively with) one another in order to raise their children properly, that would mean that single parents who are not in steady relationships are incapable of raising well-adjusted, happy children - something which is evidentially not the case.  The idea that parents who raise their children badly will cause those children to lack moral values as adults, or rather lack self-esteem which results in moral values, is also, I believe, seriously flawed.  It is true, perhaps, that children with loving parents are more likely to share their parents' moral viewpoints, but that is not always a good thing; in fact, I think it is better if children formulate their own independent moral viewpoints, as parents' moral viewpoints are all too often flawed.  Loving parents do have a tendency to instill their children with higher self-esteem, which is a good thing, but at this point we are deviating too far from the initial subject (that of prostitution, if you still remember.)

Thirdly, I agree with Ericsson that the lack of psychological well-being of prostitutes is largely due to society's attitude towards their line of work, and by extension, towards them as well.  In addition, even if there are some elements of psychological damage inherent in the work, that does not mean that society should ban the option of taking up that work.  As long as as no one was forced into prostitution, or forced to remain there, then it would be entirely their own choice to risk that psychological damage - and removing their right to make such a choice is, I think, highly paternalistic.

This does not, however, mean that I support the legality of prostitution.  There are two vitally important and related factors which all four of the essayists neglected to address - firstly, that of the possible reproductive consequences of prostitution, and secondly, that of the current ratio of voluntary prostitutes to coerced prostitutes.  Both of these would require extremely strict regulatory measures (obligatory contraception in the case of the first, and some sort of intensive qualification procedures in the case of the second) to prevent, and I do not think that society is currently in a position to enact those measures.  Until society has progressed far enough to make the implementation of such regulation possible, I think that prostitution should remain, or become, illegal.

Response: Useless Organs

In response to Brandon's post "Not Using = Misusing?" (February 26, 2012):

I agree that Levin might well think that not using something is essentially the same as misusing that thing.  Considering that he used the term 'asexual' to refer to people who wished to have sexual relations with others but for whatever reason were not able to do so, it seems likely that he is not aware of that particular orientation, and would likely disbelieve in its existence if someone informed him of it.

Furthermore, I think this idea of not using being the same as misusing probably extends to nonreproductive body parts as well.  However, once one does extend it, it becomes harder to support.  Canine teeth are intended to tear meat - does this mean that all people who do not consume meat are misusing their canine teeth?  There are muscles in the body which, in modern society, almost no one ever uses.  Also, what of apparently useless organs, such as the appendix?  Is it possible that the appendix did, historically, have a use, which is no longer utilized due to changing conditions?  If so, this might mean that all of humanity is guilty of misusing (due to not using) their appendixes.  Alternately, the appendix might truly be a useless organ, the only purpose of which is to sit there in a person's body and occasionally require surgical removal.  In that case, could one not use this to argue that not every part of the body has a single, fixed use?

Q&A 4, Second Answer

The basic form of my argument is: Do virtually all readers really agree with Levin's conclusion regarding his analogy using Jones - that Jones' behaviour will inevitably cause harm and should not be legal?

I don't think so.  My view, which I would imagine at least some others share, differs considerably from Levin's.  Firstly, I think that as long as Jones' behaviour does not harm others, and does not cause him personally to die (or possibly even if it does) it should not be illegal.  Secondly, I do not think that the behaviour will necessarily cause harm.  If Jones is some variety of apotemnophiliac, or something similar, he might well find extensive psychological relief from pulling his teeth.  Even if the experience causes him pain, and he suffers some impairment in eating ability as a result, the psychological benefits might well outweigh the negative physical effects.

Q&A 4, First Answer

The basic form of my question is: According to Levin's argument, wouldn't any sexual activity other than very straightforward, possibly child-producing intercourse also be a misuse of body parts?

Apparently.  I am not sure if Levin actually holds this view, but it does seem to follow from his argument.  It is possible that he believes this to some extent - some people, especially those who hold generally conservative views, disapprove of any type of creative sexual activity - but taking the argument to its logical limit seems too far.  For example, if one did so, kissing (which is not always sexual, but is often) would be a misuse of one's mouth.  I think that Levin is unlikely to support this view.


Furthermore, Levin also argues in favour of heterosexual, monogamous marriage - but there is some evidence to suggest that, particularly during prehistory, polygamy was actually more evolutionarily beneficial to the survival of the human race.  If this is so, and monogamous marriage is a purely cultural phenomenon, then in order to be consistent Levin would have to modify his argument to reflect this, which is something I think he probably would not do.

Backwards Arguing

After reading Michael Levin's essay, I found myself thinking about the fact that his method of argumentation seemed somewhat flipped when compared to many of the other philosophers in this book.  They mostly presented premises and evidence, and then considered only conclusions which did not contradict that evidence.  They may have guessed at their conclusions at the start, but in general their arguments began with premises and ended with conclusions.  Levin, on the other hand, appears to have started with an agenda and then refused to consider premises which might contradict it.  This is somewhat annoying, because it results in an argument which is only coherent on the surface; because Levin did not take into account any evidence which suggested a conclusion different from the one he supported.

Response: Missing Out?

In response to Chris's post "Is 'Owning' a Pet Ethical?" (February 15, 2012):

While many clear-cut cases of pet mistreatment exist, I do not think there is a problem with the concept of merely owning a pet, so long as one treats the pet well.  It may seem wrong to remove an animal from its natural environment, but consider: is the animal actually missing out on anything by becoming a pet?  In many cases, no.  There are some theories that the first domestic dogs were wild dogs which actually chose to spend time with and work alongside humans, because of the many benefits that this offered.  In the wild, most animals have short, difficult lives, and in many cases domesticating them does not appear to deprive them of many enjoyable activities.

The point about birds and fish being able to survive in the wild is quite valid, and I think that many birds do indeed miss out on a great deal by being domesticated.  However, I don't think that the problem is that they could survive in the wild and pet owners deprive them of that life; instead, I think the problem is that the pet owners do not provide substitutes for the activities they could engage in if they lived in wild environments.  Fish have very limited cognitive abilities - while it is true that many humans would go mad if confined to a small glass bowl, that is because humans require a great deal of stimulation.  Fish typically do not.  The average fish requires no more stimulation than a sparsely decorated bowl can provide.  Birds are much more intelligent, and those birds which have their wings clipped, are ignored and neglected, or are confined to small cages at all times are, I think, being mistreated; however, birds which can fly around their owners' houses, get frequent attention, and only live in a cage at night (when they would sleep in the wild anyway) are living lives which are at least as nice as most of them would have in the wild.  Basically, deciding to own a pet means assuming a responsibility to that animal to give it a life at least as nice as what it would live if it were undomesticated.

Q&A 3, Second Answer

The basic form of my question is: If Singer advocates giving up all non-essential possessions and money to famine relief, how can he justify not having done so himself?

My guess would be that he cannot.  While I do not know this for certain, as I have never met him, I do not think that it is too much of a stretch to assume that he is capable of hypocrisy.  However, regardless of whether or not he is a hypocrite, his argument has some large holes in it.  The most significant of these is, I think, the fact that the concept of famine relief creates a self-perpetuating problem - the more resources are available to a population, the larger that population will grow, until they are once again lacking resources.

Q&A 3, First Answer

The basic form of my question is: Does the fact that people surrender some control over their bodies when they agree to abide by society's rules undermine Thompson's argument that, because women own their own bodies, they can have an abortion whenever they so choose?

To a point, I think it does.  Thompson's example regarding the violinist, which she seemed to think constituted a great analogy which no one could dispute, is in fact a good analogy, but I drew a rather different conclusion from her presentation of the scenario than she appears to.  I think that one does, in fact, have a moral obligation to remain plugged to the violinist unless it causes one some serious harm (which most pregnancies do not).  People do have control over their own bodies, but not to the point where that control involves their harming others without provocation.  At that point, morality intervenes.

This is not to say that many abortions are not perfectly morally acceptable - abortions in the early stages of pregnancy, abortions when there is a serious risk to the mother's health or other sort of well-being, abortions when the child has some sort of disorder or other reason to have very bad prospects...  The reasoning is simply different.

Extent of Self-Preservation Rights

According to Tom Regan, every subject of a life has the same inherent value.  Even if we revise his theory to include different degrees of value (based off of sentience, life expectancy, and other factors), it appears that every sentient creature's life has a considerable value.  This supports the idea that one should not eat meat when it is possible to avoid doing so.  However, it seems that every organism similarly has a right to attempt to preserve its own life, so if meat is the only possible food source then it is acceptable to consume.  How far, though, does this principle extend?  If in order to preserve one's life one has to sacrifice many other lives, does one still have a right to do this?

A particular example I have in mind is that of someone who, due to a medical condition (such as certain varieties of anemia), must consume meat consistently in order to survive.  In order to preserve their own life, this person must therefore cause (directly or indirectly) the deaths of many non-human animals.  Are they justified in so doing?

I think that they are, because self-preservation rights do extend extremely far.  The question is more complicated than that, though; while the individual may have a right to preserve their own life at almost any cost if it is necessary, do we have a moral duty to interfere in the interest of preserving the greater quantity of lives, the combined value of which exceeds that of the one human life?  If we change the example to one human killing and devouring many other humans because (due to an admittedly fictional medical condition) they must consume human flesh in order to survive, I think that most would agree that we do indeed have such an obligation.

I do not think this extends to the human/non-animal example, however.  I think that the obligation present latter example (a human eating humans) is evolutionary in nature rather than moral.  If we create a third example, in which a dog must consume multiple other dogs in order to survive, I do not think that we have a moral obligation to interfere, because the dog is merely exercising its right to preserve its own life.  As we are not dogs, we do not have a duty to interfere unless the dog is killing more dogs than are necessary to continue living.  Similarly, we do not interfere in a wolf's killing deer and elk.

This subject gave me quite a lot of trouble, and I am still not certain that the line of reasoning I have followed is entirely valid.  If anyone has any ideas on this subject, I would very much appreciate reading them!