In class yesterday we discussed whether amoralism was actually possible to subscribe to in a practical, as opposed to merely a theoretical, sense. The consensus seemed to be that it was not. However, I am not certain that I agree with this conclusion; it might, I think, be possible to live amorally, depending on the exact definition of amoral.
One of the initial pieces of evidence against amoralism was the fact that in order to agree that amoralism is the most realistic and accurate point of view to take, one must make a value judgement that truth is preferable to untruth. However, apparently this does not have to be a moral judgement - it could be defined as a normative judgement instead. If this is the case, then other very basic value judgements could also, perhaps, be considered normative. With this in mind, I will present here a tentative example of a practical amoral philosophy.
A person believes that morality does not exist. There is no objective right and wrong or good and evil (whether universal or contextual). However, they choose to live mostly in accord with traditionally accepted moral views, because doing so feels the nicest. It feels nice because evolution has led to certain actions evoking certain emotions in people - for example, seeing someone smile can make one feel nice - and because the person has grown up instilled with values which, while to this person appear entirely subjective, still have some sort of emotional impact as they are now ingrained. The person does not believe that conforming to evolutionary and societal values is 'right', but they don't think it is 'wrong' either, because right and wrong do not exist in their view. Their justification for conforming to these views is, primarily, 'why not?' The only judgement a life like this requires is that feeling nice is preferable to not feeling nice, which might (or might not; that is why this is a tentative example) be normative rather than moral.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Value of Adult Lives vs. Children's Lives
In quite a large number of societies around the world, including contemporary American society, most people seem to place a higher value on the lives of children, especially infants, than they do on the lives of adults. Particularly when considering the controversial issues of euthanasia and abortion, this ranking of values seems important to analyze and subject to possible revision.
A large part of the exceptionally strong aversion to killing infants felt by many people is likely evolutionary - protecting one's own young aids in passing on one's genes to the next generation, and that can be extended to protecting a relative's young, and perhaps even to any young in one's own species. A similarly sized part also seems to be societal, possibly related to religion - more than one religion asserts that children are born innocent, 'without sin' so to speak, and so are inherently better, somehow, than those people who have lived for long enough to have transgressed against whatever doctrines the religion contains.
However, while I agree that killing infants (fully sentient infants, as opposed to non-sentient fetuses) is indeed something that people should avoid doing, I would argue that killing slightly older children or adults is actually worse morally speaking in most circumstances in which the primary variable is the age of the person dying. This is because infants have only potential; it is not guaranteed that they will have good or enjoyable lives. Adults (at least most adults who are not suicidal or severely depressed) not only have potential, but also have something to lose - namely, anything they have enjoyed so far in their lives which is possible to keep enjoying (a hobby, a fun career, friendships and other relationships).
A large part of the exceptionally strong aversion to killing infants felt by many people is likely evolutionary - protecting one's own young aids in passing on one's genes to the next generation, and that can be extended to protecting a relative's young, and perhaps even to any young in one's own species. A similarly sized part also seems to be societal, possibly related to religion - more than one religion asserts that children are born innocent, 'without sin' so to speak, and so are inherently better, somehow, than those people who have lived for long enough to have transgressed against whatever doctrines the religion contains.
However, while I agree that killing infants (fully sentient infants, as opposed to non-sentient fetuses) is indeed something that people should avoid doing, I would argue that killing slightly older children or adults is actually worse morally speaking in most circumstances in which the primary variable is the age of the person dying. This is because infants have only potential; it is not guaranteed that they will have good or enjoyable lives. Adults (at least most adults who are not suicidal or severely depressed) not only have potential, but also have something to lose - namely, anything they have enjoyed so far in their lives which is possible to keep enjoying (a hobby, a fun career, friendships and other relationships).
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Response: New Words?
In response to JonDavid's post "Personal Thoughts on Killing vs. Letting Die" (January 29, 2012):
The idea that the usual usage of the term 'killing' has caused the idea that killing is worse than letting die, independent of any other variables, to become ingrained in our minds strikes me as a very good point. Because of the almost subconscious negative implications of the term 'killing', it is very easy for a person arguing against euthanasia, for example, to make statements which are actually untrue seem plausible or even quite reasonable. In modern English as it is used in America, in fact, 'killing' when used in regards to human beings has become virtually synonymous with 'murder' - which literally means 'unjustified killing'.
It might be helpful if there were a word which meant 'unjustified letting die'. That would help people to give the same ethical subtext to killing and to letting die - whether that subtext was 'unjustified' or nothing at all. As it is, perhaps it is best when using these terms in an argument to clarify that neither killing nor letting die is necessarily immoral, but that both can be depending on the circumstances.
The idea that the usual usage of the term 'killing' has caused the idea that killing is worse than letting die, independent of any other variables, to become ingrained in our minds strikes me as a very good point. Because of the almost subconscious negative implications of the term 'killing', it is very easy for a person arguing against euthanasia, for example, to make statements which are actually untrue seem plausible or even quite reasonable. In modern English as it is used in America, in fact, 'killing' when used in regards to human beings has become virtually synonymous with 'murder' - which literally means 'unjustified killing'.
It might be helpful if there were a word which meant 'unjustified letting die'. That would help people to give the same ethical subtext to killing and to letting die - whether that subtext was 'unjustified' or nothing at all. As it is, perhaps it is best when using these terms in an argument to clarify that neither killing nor letting die is necessarily immoral, but that both can be depending on the circumstances.
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