Possibility of Amoralism

In class yesterday we discussed whether amoralism was actually possible to subscribe to in a practical, as opposed to merely a theoretical, sense.  The consensus seemed to be that it was not.  However, I am not certain that I agree with this conclusion; it might, I think, be possible to live amorally, depending on the exact definition of amoral.

One of the initial pieces of evidence against amoralism was the fact that in order to agree that amoralism is the most realistic and accurate point of view to take, one must make a value judgement that truth is preferable to untruth.  However, apparently this does not have to be a moral judgement - it could be defined as a normative judgement instead.  If this is the case, then other very basic value judgements could also, perhaps, be considered normative.  With this in mind, I will present here a tentative example of a practical amoral philosophy.

A person believes that morality does not exist.  There is no objective right and wrong or good and evil (whether universal or contextual).  However, they choose to live mostly in accord with traditionally accepted moral views, because doing so feels the nicest.  It feels nice because evolution has led to certain actions evoking certain emotions in people - for example, seeing someone smile can make one feel nice - and because the person has grown up instilled with values which, while to this person appear entirely subjective, still have some sort of emotional impact as they are now ingrained.  The person does not believe that conforming to evolutionary and societal values is 'right', but they don't think it is 'wrong' either, because right and wrong do not exist in their view.  Their justification for conforming to these views is, primarily, 'why not?'  The only judgement a life like this requires is that feeling nice is preferable to not feeling nice, which might (or might not; that is why this is a tentative example) be normative rather than moral.