The basic form of my question is: Is unplugging oneself from the violinist (in Thompson's essay) really morally justified, if one has only to stay plugged to him for no more or less than nine months to ensure his survival?
This is a tricky subject, and I think the answer depends on a variety of variables - something which Thompson apparently neglected when developing this example. If one suffers minimal enduring negative consequences by remaining plugged to the violinist, then I would actually say that one is morally obligated to remain plugged to him. However, if one is confined to bed, loses one's job, and causes one's friends severe stress by being mysteriously missing for nine months, then I think that one is free of that obligation - although one would not be acting too supererogatarily if one decided to remain plugged to him. As far as this example is comparable to most abortion situations, I think that one should not unplug oneself. Most of the time, a pregnant woman would be able to remain normally functional for a large portion of the nine months. Many employers allow for maternity leave, and a pregnant woman does not typically mysteriously disappear from her normal life!
Of course, there are exceptional circumstances, such as wherein a woman risks her life if she does not get an abortion, or she will suffer serious societal consequences, or she does not want the child (but is unwilling to have it aborted or adopted) and will treat it badly, and those require reevaluation. Also, I do not think that fetuses count as living beings, so up until a certain point there is absolutely no moral obligation on the part of a woman to let the fetus develop into a conscious being.
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